A new phase of confrontation in the “Cold War”

The end of the 1970s saw a worsening in relations between the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR. Both were disappointed with the results of the détente, and each was convinced that the other had profited more from it. The Soviet Union was particularly hard hit by the world-wide recession, and its cooperation with the USA had not led to the desired trade advantages. In the USA, on the other hand, the politics of détente had never enjoyed unanimous support. Under the presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) it actually seemed as if the USSR had returned to its expansionist policy at the expense of an America weakened by Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. While the Soviet Union was on the advance in Asia, where a reunited Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia declared their allegiance to Moscow, the USA suffered a heavy defeat in the region with the fall of the Shah of Iran in January 1979 and the proclamation of the Islamic Republic. In Africa too, Communism was established in several countries, such as the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola. Finally, the events of December 1979 in Afghanistan brought the politics of détente to an end, when Russian troops entered the country to help a government put in place by Moscow in its fight against Islamic rebels.

In 1981, Ronald Reagan was elected US President, marking the return to a policy of confrontation with the USSR and the start of a new phase in the Cold War. Reagan dubbed the Soviet Union “The Evil Empire” and after his re-election in 1984, he tried to secure America's (military) supremacy by means of the Strategic Defence Initiative, the so-called Star Wars program. The aim of the program was to install a shield consisting of satellites to provide protection against missiles. In contrast to the conciliatory approach of his predecessor, Reagan launched an arms race which extended into space. The results of this strategic and technological development were clearly felt in Europe during the cruise missile crisis, which was triggered by the Soviet Union’s decision in the mid-1970s to station mid-range SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe, a move understood as a commitment to the modernization of its weapon systems. The international climate deteriorated and the stationing of cruise missiles was seen as an attempt to destabilize the arms balance, the so-called “balance of terror”. In 1979, NATO passed the two-track decision: from 1983, if disarmament talks in Europe were not successful by that time, the United States would station Pershing missiles in Europe. Moscow stood firm and accused Washington of starting a new arms race.

The arming of NATO with mid-range weapons became a controversial public and political issue, especially in West Germany, where the particularly heated nature of the debate was due to the fact that Pershing 2 mid-range missiles were to be stationed solely in West Germany, raising fears that a proxy nuclear war between the two military blocs could be fought on German territory. The peace movement that had emerged during the period of nuclear armament campaigned for a nuclear-free Europe with the slogan “Build Peace Without Weapons” and enjoyed widespread support among the population. But the governments stuck to their decision and the first Pershing missiles were stationed in November 1983. In the early 1980’s, the East/West divide and the polarization of the world seemed so firmly established that they were considered insurmountable. The system of international relations was ossified, allowing little scope for change.

During the Cold War, trade relations between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and the EEC were almost non-existent. The USSR viewed any such cooperation as doomed to failure due to the inherent contradictions of capitalism. The economic successes achieved by the Community in the 1960s had little effect on the Soviet position, so that its satellite states were able to develop only a low level of trade with the EEC. In 1975, after the Helsinki Summit, Comecon proposed the establishment of bilateral relations. The EEC turned down the proposal so as not to legitimate Moscow’s domination of the Comecon member countries. Instead, the EEC made agreements with individual eastern European states.