From the building of the Wall to Willy Brandt’s “Ostpolitik”

The Berlin Wall was only possible under the conditions of the Cold War, but it was not an inevitable consequence of the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, it was built on the initiative of the East German government, which developed a huge interest in totally sealing off the border to the West as a result of the ongoing wave of people expressing their discontent with Socialism by leaving the country. From 1960, there was a noticeable resurgence in the number of refugees. In 1960 alone, almost 200,000 people fled East Germany, with 75 percent leaving via West Berlin. In 1961, around 1,500 people left every day, most of them members of the working population. In March 1961, Walter Ulbricht, the secretary-general of the SED, responded by presenting the Warsaw Pact countries with a proposal for the erection of a barbed wire frontier between East and West Berlin. Initially, the idea was rejected, partly because Khrushchev wanted to wait and see what position the new US President J.F. Kennedy would take on the Berlin question, and partly due to disgusted reactions from other Communist leaders. Like the SED leadership, however, the Kremlin also had a strong interest in the stabilization of East Germany, as it feared a revolution could set off a domino effect, jeopardizing Soviet hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe. When the Wall was built, Khrushchev took responsibility for giving the orders. This was also the official version of events within East Germany. According to the Soviet ambassador in East Berlin at the time, however, Ulbricht came to him in late June/early July 1961 with a dramatic account of events designed to convinced the eastern bloc of the need for a definitive sealing off of Berlin's western sectors: “If this situation at the open border continues, a collapse [of the East German state] [is] inevitable. On July 31, 1961, Ulbricht arrived in Moscow, where Khrushchev agreed to the sealing of the border. According to reports, Ulbricht immediately began discussing the details of the operation such as the installation of barbed wire and fences and the severing of underground train connections between the eastern and western sectors. At the same time, he proposed the building of a wall. In retrospect, Ulbricht’s answer at a press conference in East Berlin on July 15, 1961, was proof that at this time, there were already plans to build a wall, especially as his denial came in response to a journalist who had not used the word “wall”: “If I understood the question correctly, you are saying that there are people in West Germany who want us to mobilize the construction workers of the capital of East Germany to build a wall. I have no knowledge of any such plans. (...) No one has the intention of building a wall.”

On the night of August 12/13, 1961, the Berlin Wall was built, transforming the border between the occupied sectors of the city into a state border, officially as a necessary means of maintaining peace and as an “anti-fascist rampart”. The following morning, the population was presented with a fait accompli. The border guards soon received orders to shoot anyone trying to escape. While the wall was being built, many successful escape attempts took place.

Although the building of the wall shocked the public and politicians of West Germany, it did not come as a total surprise. In secret memoranda, the American ambassador in Moscow (in March 1961), the British ambassador in Bonn (in early August 1961) and the CIA had spoken of a possible sealing off of the border between the occupied sectors in Berlin (the latter as early as November 1, 1957). The confidential statement made by U.S. Secretary of State Dan Rusk on August 15, 1961, according to which the building of the Wall actually made a solution of the Berlin problem “easier”, can only be understood in terms of the Berlin crisis where all sides reckoned with the possibility of war, probably nuclear war. With this cementing of the status quo, future conflicts sparked by the status of Berlin became very much less likely. The Berlin crisis itself was sparked in 1958 by the Soviet demand for the “transformation of Berlin into an autonomous political entity” that was to be demilitarized (meaning a withdrawal of the Allies). Over the following years, the possible reactions of the West were played out in various scenarios ranging from negotiations with the Soviets through to a determined military response with nuclear weapons.

After the building of the Wall, the western powers went no further than handing over diplomatic notes expressing protest in strong terms. In the face of such restrained reactions from the West, Berlin's mayor Willy Brandt voiced the disappointment of West Berliners in his speech on August 16 in front of West Berlin’s City Hall: “Berlin expects more than words. Berlin expects political action”. During the official visit to Berlin by U.S. President John F. Kennedy in 1963, the eastern side of the Brandenburg Gate, that stood immediately behind the wall in the Soviet sector, was draped with lengths of red cloth. This obscured the view entirely – also for anyone wishing to see the American president from East Berlin. During this visit, Kennedy declared his solidarity with the people of West Berlin: “All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of [West] Berlin. And, therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ [I am a Berliner].” For nearly three years, the newly erected border kept Berlin families apart. It was only in December 1963 that the first pass agreement allowed West Berliners to visit their relatives in East Berlin during the Christmas period.

In West Germany, even the question of whether or not to talk to the other German state was controversial and the subject of emotional debate, since dialogue with East Germany was understood at the time as an acknowledgement of the division of the country. But while the former West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer had categorically refused any negotiation with the Soviets as a de-facto recognition of East Germany, the western Allies advocated talks with representatives of East Germany in some cases and certainly did not want to rule contacts out in the future. For President Kennedy, dialogue with Moscow (especially on issues of arms control) took priority over German reunification, although this goal remained the founding consensus of the West German state. The three essentials on the status of Berlin established by Kennedy in August 1961 (free access for the western Allies, West Germans and West Berliners; stationing of western troops; economic linking of the western sectors to the rest of West Germany), referred to the western sectors of the city without mentioning the Soviet sector or the city as a whole. After the building of the wall, a slow process of rethinking took place in West Germany’s policy concerning the two German states: when it became clear that the division was set to last for an unforeseeable period of time, normalization of mutual relations became a political goal. New stimuli came from the “Ostpolitik” of Willy Brandt, who became chancellor in 1969, which allowed a relaxing of relations between the two Germanies under his motto of “change through rapprochement”.

The signing in 1970 of the Moscow Treaty with its comprehensive commitment to non-aggression allowed West Germany to improve its relations with the USSR. Both states recognized the inviolability of their existing borders. Further treaties covering reconciliation and legal issues arising from World War II were signed with Poland and Czechoslovakia. In 1972, the Fundamental Treaty was signed between the two German states. Although they did not recognize each other as states under international law, they did acknowledge each other as separate state entities by establishing diplomatic relations. Both states set up not “embassies” but “permanent missions”. The Federal Republic of Germany abandoned its claim to sole representative legitimacy and recognized the German Democratic Republic as its equal. But West German citizenship law, according to which every German may claim citizenship of the Federal Republic (including East German citizens and people of German origin outside West Germany, i.e. the descendents of German minorities), remained unchanged. The status of West Berlin was regulated as follows: links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic were accepted, with Allied Law remaining in force in the city. Egon Bahr, who headed the delegation which negotiated the Fundamental Treaty, gave the following summary: “In the past, Bonn had no relations with East Germany. Now at least it has poor relations.”